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The UK has committed over 拢2.5 billion to its 2026 , and companies are stating that they plan to deliver commercial scale fusion facilities in the 2030s. Fusion power is beneficial for the generation of clean electricity, however, there is potential for the components of this system to be misused in weapon proliferation. Here, and outline how the international non-proliferation regime has not yet caught up with the technology and explain what steps policymakers need to take before fusion reaches commercial scale.

• Fusion reactors are capable of producing weapons-usable material and rely on fuels which could have applications in nuclear weapons programmes.
• No UK regulator currently holds responsibility for preventing the diversion or misuse of fusion technologies.
• The UK should establish a DESNZ-led technical expert group to assess fusion's proliferation risks and shape proportionate regulatory guidance. The group should also draw on lessons from fission and other sectors to inform its approach.

The neutron problem

Fusion reactions produce high-energy neutrons, and these neutrons could turn fertile material like uranium-238 into weapons-usable material. Under today's safeguards framework, that neutron environment does not fall under regulatory requirement unless qualifying nuclear material like enriched uranium or plutonium happens to be declared on site.

Researchers have modelled what would happen if fertile material, like uranium-238, were placed inside a fusion device. The results suggest such a setup could, in principle, produce around 20kg of plutonium or uranium per week. That is more than the International Atomic Energy Agency鈥檚 (IAEA's)"significant quantity" (the amount they consider enough to build a nuclear weapon). As fusion facilities adopt increasingly flexible experimental configurations such as variable blankets, changeable coolants, irradiation test modules, the question of how regulatory confidence is maintained becomes harder to avoid.

Tritium, lithium and deuterium

Most fusion reactors under development run on two fuels, deuterium and tritium, fused together to release energy. Because tritium is rare, reactors also use lithium-6 to "breed" more tritium as they operate, keeping the fuel supply going. None of these three materials are classified as nuclear material under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor do they fall in the scope of IAEA safeguards.

That gap matters because tritium is a weapons booster. Only a few grams of tritium can be enough to increase a weapon鈥檚 yield. Further, lithium-6 can be used in thermonuclear weapon construction. Today's research-scale inventories are small and managed through bilateral agreements and operational practice. But as fusion moves to commercial scale, tritium inventories are set to grow by orders of magnitude, and simulations suggest quantities could in principle be diverted from a facility without being detected by today's monitoring technology. There is currently no standardised, internationally recognised accountancy framework for tritium at that scale.

The co-location of technologies together

Perhaps the most striking gap is an issue that has not been considered yet: co-location. A commercial fusion facility will, by virtue of its design, bring together on one site a neutron source capable of producing weapon usable material, tritium capable of boosting the yield of a nuclear weapon, and lithium-6 and deuterium, both used in thermonuclear weapon construction. Considered together, on a single site, no framework currently asks what the combined picture means for safeguards.

Why now?

This does not mean fusion is somehow outside the non-proliferation regime. The NPT, IAEA safeguards and export control arrangements were built for a different era and a different technology. The problem is that fusion sits in the gaps between them, in ways nobody anticipated because, until recently, nobody needed to.

Fusion facility designs are still flexible. Regulatory frameworks are always easier to build into a technology than to retrofit onto it, and the UK, as a major fusion investor and a recognised Nuclear-Weapon State under the NPT, is well placed to lead this work internationally. That's why this analysis recommends that the UK鈥檚 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero establish a technical expert group now, bringing together fusion engineers, safeguards specialists and regulators, to assess neutron-source risk, map the potential risks posed by tritium, lithium-6 and deuterium, review export controls, and tackle the co-location question at the facility design stage, before plants are built.

This does not require new treaties. It requires the UK Government to assess the risks, give its regulators clear direction, and engage the IAEA and export control community with a considered position, while the window to do that cost-effectively and pragmatically is still open.

Dr Nour Hammoud is the author of the Dalton Nuclear Institute鈥檚 latest policy position paper 鈥楢 new look at non-proliferation for fusion energy鈥� 鈥� .